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APROPOS THE LAST "POST-": 
CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE, 
THEORY AND INTERPRETATION. 
Raymond Aaron Younis 
In one sense, it seems that we live in an age of widely proliferating 
and seemingly omnipresent "post-s". The literature on 
poststructuralism, postmode.rnityl and postcolonialism and their 
variants is already vast and it is expanding constantly at a rate 
that is quite overwhelming, not to say bewildering. And yet one can 
still argue that it is a somewhat neglected fact that thinkers such 
as Derrida and Foucault, who are sometimes called 
"poststructuralists", have/had a significant, direct and localised 
interest in a number of questions and answers which might with 
some justification be labelled "religious".2 
Though the strategies of reading differ considerably, and 
though the texts which are analysed are quite diverse, Judaism, 
Christianity, mythology and the figure or name of the deity 
remain(ed) important topics in their writings. Other thinkers such 
as Edward Said and Toni Morrison, who are particularly interested 
in the discourses of colonisation, in ways of exposing their tropes 
and structures, and liberating the suppressed subject from the 
institutions of the imperialist, offer alternative approaches and 
critiques which are of great interest. Fuxthermore, the work of such 
thinkers, it will be argued, whatever one thinks of the "post-s", 
can be quite instructive with regard to contemporary Australian 
literature. Indeed, works by Patrick White, David Malouf and 
Peter Carey involve elements which provide analogues and 
parallels in relation to the discourses of poststructuralism and/ or 
postcolonialism. 
Though "poststructuralist" is a useful term in some respects, it 
remains somewhat problematic. Certainly, it signifies a critique of 
attempts to establish a new "science" of signs or stable binary units 
of interpretation which will a1low a systematic analysis of the 
domain of empirical and mythological phenomena. Certainly, it 
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can be used to indicate a departure from the strategies and 
discourses of thinkers such as de Saussure, Levi-Strauss and 
Greimas. But like many such terms it might suggest to some readers 
that the similarities are more important than the differences 
between these thinkers. Or it might suggest that there these 
thinkers are essentially the same sort of thinkers. A careful 
reading will suggest that it is the differences between Derrida and 
Foucault that are most striking. These differences might be 
clarified through a consideration of their views on elements of 
religion and myth. 
Foucault , as is well known, was concerned with relationships 
of power and subjection and with the dynamics of their formation 
and proliferation. He was, for example, greatly interested in the 
relationship between the "care of the self" and the effects of 
emergent Christianity, though this aspect of his thought has not 
attracted very much attention.3 He understood Christianity as a 
religion in which the "care of the self" is primarily connected with 
renunciation. Renunciation, in this sense, refers to the self, 
certainly, but also to "all worldly attachments",4 and to all that 
"could be love of self''. Christianity, according to Foucault, 
introduced salvation as something which is otherwordly, 
something which is not a part of this life, and in the process, 
unbalanced or "upset" the notion of the "care of the self". In 
contrast to Christianity, Foucault believed that Greek and Roman 
views of the self privileged human life. They he believed did not 
give human life a lower value in the scheme of things ... The "care 
for the self" in this non-Christian context, then, according to 
Foucault, involves emphasising one's actions and the place one 
occupies for example as a citizen or as a member of a community. 
If one believes Foucault, the desire for salvation after death 
is not a privileged notion among the Greeks and Romans. 
Christianity marked, for Foucault, a gradual shift in morality 
from "Antiquity's" concern with the affirmation of nature, the 
individual's liberty, or in other words, from an ethic in which one 
could see one's life as a "personal work of art"5 that one could 
develop without reference to the notion of an otherworldly 
existence. In Christianity, he asserted, "the religion of the text" 
and the idea of the will of God are paramount. Consequently, 
morality "took on increasingly the form of a code of rules" and 
obedience to the system followed. Foucault could not and did not 
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wish to reconcile the search for "a personal ethics" with the 
codified principles of Christianity. 
Foucault was also very interested, though this might surprise 
many of his readers, in spirituality. His tentative definition of the 
term is as follows: "That which precisely refers to a subject 
acceding to a certain mode of being and to the transformations 
which the subject must make of himself in order to accede to this 
mode of being" (Ethic, p.14) This definition is characteristic 
though it raises numerous problems. He seemed to be thinkjng of 
cases for example, where one might accede to a "mode of being" 
such as certainty (in the Cartesian sense) or lack of doubt. Yet he 
did not explain just why there should be only one mode of being; nor 
did he explain just why the singular should suffice in such 
discussions. He also asserted, somewhat cryptically and oddly, 
that ancient spirituality was identical or almost identical with 
philosophy (Ethic, p. 14). (This identity or near identity seems 
odd because the origins of western philosophy, that is to say the 
natural philosophies of the Milesians, are generally explained in 
terms of a break, or attempted break, with religious and 
mythological explanations of the most fundamental problems of 
cosmology and cosmogony.) 
It is very difficult to convey the intricacies of Derrida's 
writing in a summary. The aim, as always, is to articulate a form of 
writing which simultaneously suggests multiple readings and 
points of view, which multiplies resonances, ambiguities and 
positions- he attempts to multiply the semantic density of a text. 
Indeed, Derrida it seems, wishes to problematise the notion that 
God can be sought and found "around" a trope, a figure of speech, a 
grammatical structure or an ellipsis, or in short, in forms of 
language. 
Also, whereas Foucault was interested in Christianity h1 the 
context of historiographic and genealogical surveys of the "care of 
the self" and of the practices of liberty, Derrida is interested in 
ways of speaking of/to the deity,6 in mythical narxatives and 
figures which reveal a fundamental resistance to systematic or 
univocal interpretations. One of his most striking and brilliant 
though flawed meditations is on the tower of Babel. Babel_ he 
argues, is a myth which highlights the inadequacy of one tongue 
among others. The myth also, according to Derrida, informs us of a 
"need" for the adoption of figures and tropes, for myth itself, for 
"twists and turns" in language, and also for translations (the myth 
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is of course available to us in English or French, not generally in 
Hebrew). Yet translation is precisely the problem, as far as 
Derrida is concerned. He will argue that such translations are 
inadequate and therefore cannot "compensate"7 for all that is lost 
in the very process of attempting to translate one text into another. 
The "tower of Babel", then, suggests an "irreducible 
multiplicity", that is, a complexity which is difficult to overcome 
or control. Attempts to provide a single authoritative 
interpretation are defeated. The very notion of systematic analysis 
becomes somewhat problematic because of the ambiguities and 
semantic density of the text. So, according to Derrida, such myths 
highlight the failure to offer a comprehensive interpretation of 
the narrative. 
Babel is not just a proper name. It is also a common noun which 
not only means "confusion" of tongues and of architects whose plans 
are interrupted. "Babel" also means the name of God as the name of 
a "father". The people of Babel hear the name of God who has 
marked with "his patronym" the place where understanding (in 
the sense of systematic comprehension) has become impossible 
(p.246). They are confused and their understanding is fragmented. 
In the deconstruction of Babel, then, one finds that 
ambiguities and enigmas emerge. Attempts to resolve these by 
appealing to rational or universal frameworks of meaning fail. So, 
according to Derrida, God gives the inhabitants of Babel the name 
of confusion as a form of punishment. The name of God, in this sense, 
is in Derrida's words, "the mark" and "the seal" which proclaims 
"confusion" (p. 248). Why are they punished? If one accepts 
Derrida's analysis, they are punished because they wished to 
"make a name for themselves, to give themselves the name, to 
construct for and by themselves their own name". They are defiant 
and proud. And they are punished because they had wanted to 
gain, by themselves, to be sure of, by themselves, "a unique and 
universal genealogy". God's name in this myth is violently 
imposed upon those who seek their own name and seek it in their 
own terms - terms which then are rendered indecipherable or 
incomprehensible. The violent imposition of the proper name (pun 
intended) of confusion inaugurates the deconstruction of the tower, 
of the language, of the structures (both architectural and 
grammatical) here. In breaking the lineage, translation is imposed 
and yet forbidden: one must translate and yet one cannot surmount 
the problems that accompany translation. The interruption of the 
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construction (of the tower and of monolithic interpretation) 
produces a disschemination: a failure to impose or effect a 
universal language; a submission to a plurality of tongues which is 
henceforth inescapable.B Such a failure constitutes the sort of thing 
that Derrida calls "the Babelian performance" (p. 253). 
This interpretation of the narrative is crucial not just because 
it raises a number of problems about translation but also because it 
suggests much about Derrida's interest in myth. A full evaluation 
cannot be given here for obvious reasons. But it must be said that 
Derrida's interpretation is often quite lucid, and it shows, if the 
explication has been clear enough, just how incisive, at times, 
deconstructive readings can be. However, it must also be said that 
Derrida, it seems unwittingly, creates considerable problems for 
himself: if one accepts his own claims about incompleteness, 
division and multiplication (no pun intended) and the failure of 
the desire to control or close, it then becomes difficult to see how 
his own attempt to characterise "the Babelian performance", even 
through analogies, can in any sense be acceptable or adequate or 
rigorous. Or in other words, Babel, if it is, as he believes, a mark of 
multiplying meanings, would exceed and evade the very terms that 
Derrida wishes to employ in his text in relation to the attempt to 
describe what "the Babelian performance" might be like. The 
excluded, the uncontrollable, the proliferating levels of meaning, 
if one accepts these as valid notions, would then emerge or 
multiply in advance of the reading(s) that Derrida is already in 
the process of attempting to provide. And though multiplication 
and dissemination would not necessarily be sufficient to produce a 
refutation of his readings, they would render much if not ail of 
what he attempts to say about "the Babelian performance" highly 
problema tic. 
Indeed, it is this sort of dilemma, one assumes, which might 
have led thinkers such as Toni Morrison and Edward Said, to 
distance themselves from poststructuralism. These are thinkers 
who are concerned not so much with the proliferating structures of 
language or with the labyrinthine readings of texts and tropes. 
They are interested in how discourses are used to establish, 
transmit and perpetuate forms of domination for example through 
the institutions of imperialism. 
Said for example, has been concerned for many years with the 
demystification of impei"ialism and its strategies. In the 1960s he 
rejected Derrida's work as "nihilistic"9 though to be fail" Derrida 
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has consistently rejected this description. Subsequently, Said 
wished to emphasise the ways in which European culture had been 
imposed and reinforced by the colonisers' insistence that things 
oriental are barbarous, evil, and in need of enlightenment. 
"Orientalism" is Said's term for the West's strategies of 
domination, restructuring and exercising authority over the Orient. 
Unlike Derrida, however, Said stresses not textuality and 
intertextuality but "worldliness" (which is to say, the domains of 
actual political problems and possible solutions). If one believes 
Said, poststructuralism's concern with textuality results in a 
"critical non-interference" which coincides with increases in 
militarism, imperialism and oppression. Said seems to believe 
that the concern with textuality in itself leads the critic in the 
direction of the enigmatic, the mysterious, the numinous or 
spiritual. Said advocates a type of "secular criticism" which 
address, directly, "the political, social and human values" (p. 
127). Secular criticism involves an awareness, certainly, of the 
resistance to theory, but ensures that criticism is open "toward 
historical reality", society, "human needs and interests"- it 
highlights "concrete instances" drawn from the everyday. 
So, Said chooses to concentrate on issues such as Zionist 
propaganda, atheism (which he advocates), and ways of 
transmitting, forming and institutionalising ideas for the purposes 
of establishing cultural hegemony. He privileges notions of 
community that are based on concrete "interdependent experiences" 
such as the encounter with militaristic thinking and its effects. His 
commitment to Palestinian activism is one of the reasons why he 
argues that Foucault's thought, whose influence he has 
acknowledged, leads to a more rather than a less cynical position 
(p.134) with regard to direct political involvement. He has 
continued to resist the dogmatic element and the determinism that 
he finds in poststructuralism and especially in Foucault.10 And 
crucially he rejects the Judaic and Christian myths and 
mythologies which Derrida and Foucault are/were clearly 
interested in. 
Toni Morrison interprets the Tower of Babel, unlike Derrida, 
as a narrative that suggests that "one monolithic language would 
have expedited the building and heaven would have been 
reached".ll But language as Morrison understands it, "arcs toward 
the place where meaning may lie" (p. 6); its force lies in its ability 
to "reach toward the ineffable" (p.7); it "surges toward knowledge, 
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not its destruction" or its problematisation. Morrison's analyses of 
American literature are intended to reveal a language which can 
"powerfully evoke and enforce hidden signs" of racism, cultural 
domination, and a "dismissive 'othedng' of people and idioms 
which are by no means marginal".12 These idioms, furthermore, are 
examples of language use where meaning is not endlessly deferred 
or elusive. She discusses canons which suggest that a country's 
literature, the USA's, is free of the presence of Africans and 
African-Americans. In other words, she questions a canon which 
excludes the presence of an entire culture. Yet she argues that this 
other element is inextricable, though ignored, notwithstanding the 
intricate strategies which are undertaken to "erase its presence 
from view" (p.9). Her aims are to identify the moments when 
American literature became complicit in the very processes of 
racism; to determine how and when literature undermined racism; 
to reflect on "how African personae, narrative and idiom ... 
enriched the text in self-conscious ways" (p. 16). 
Indeed, she suggests that the "breakdown in the logic and 
machinery of plot construction" (p.25) highlights the destabilising 
impact of race on narratives; the irruption of the repressed in and 
through tropes and figures. Things go awry, according to Morrison, 
in spite of the author's intentions. This is why Morrison speaks of a 
"haunting, a darkness" from which early American literature 
"seemed unable to extricate itself" (p.32). So, what she finds in 
much American literature is a construction of blackness and 
enslavement which suggests non-freedom and non-personhood. The 
literary imagination then is used to allay deep psychic fears of 
Africans and to "rationalize external exploitation" (p.38). The 
result is a "reined-in, bound, suppressed, and repressed darkness" 
which is associated with "the African" in literature. What is 
worse, processes of enslavement were carried out in the name of 
"enlightenment". The presence of Africans, encoded, becomes a 
metaphor for "transacting" the process of Americanisation "while 
burying its particular racial ingredients" (p.47). 
Ultimately, Morrison wishes to question the "subjective nature 
of ascribing value and meaning to colour": the very presence of the 
non-free (the African) in the very "heart of the democratic 
experiment" (American life) - the master narrative of master 
(white) and slave (black) (p.48). And she asks a question that is 
penetrating and troubling: "how could one speak of .. . progress, 
suffragism, Christianity ... without having as a referent, at the 
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heart of the discourse, at the heart of definition, the [erased or 
suppressed] presence of Africans and their descendants?" 
Four topics, she suggests, require investigation in the wake of 
the imperialists' suppressions and erasures: first, the status of the 
Africanist character as "enabler and surrogate" (p.51); second, how 
an Africanist idiom is used to mark the onset of modernity, that is, 
how dialogue comes to be seen as alien, used to reinforce 
hierarchies of race, appropriated in discourses about sexuality, 
"fear of madness, expulsion, self-loathing" (p.52); thirdly, the 
ways in which black characters are strategically deployed in 
order to enhance the qualities of white characters; and finally, the 
manipulation of stories about black people within works on 
morality, codes of behaviour, notions of civilisation and reason. 
(An evaluation of Morrison's and Said's critiques of colonialism is 
beyond the scope of this paper and will be pursued in a subsequent 
paper.) 
What does all of this have to with the writing of White, 
Malouf and Carey? Well, White was very interested in the 
suppression of indigenous cultures; the employment of tropes for the 
purpose of perpetuating relationships of racial inequality; and the 
extent to which the force of the repressed irrupts through the 
seemingly ordered and stable surfaces of the language. He was also 
interested in the ethic of renunciation, and like Foucault, seemed to 
regard this as one of the chief characteristics of religiosity (one 
might think of Ellen in a Fringe of Leaves, Theodora Goodman, 
Voss and Himmelfarb who variously cast off the inessential in 
their search for a mode of being which brings greater simplicity, 
purity, unity and/ or insight). He explored the abjection and the 
predicament of the colonised in figures such as Alf Dubbo in Riders 
in the Chariot and some of the aboriginals in Voss, for example. 
(They seem similar in many respects to those whom Fanon called 
"the wretched of the earth".) Carey and Malouf seem to be aware 
of this: certainly, both have mentioned White as a crucial 
influence on their works and both have cited Voss as a crucial text. 
But what is more striking perhaps is the interest in Babylon 
which is apparent in the fiction of Malouf and Carey. Carey, like 
Derrida, is interested in the deconstruction of Babylon; Malouf is 
interested in highlighting the failures of the coloniser through the 
appropriation of the name which has multiple associations in the 
Bible: hegemony (over Mesopotamia), conquest, exile, false 
prophecies and divinations (Jeremiah), shame, luxury, 
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abominations (Revelation), idolatry (Daniel), ambition and pride 
(Genesis). 
Babylon, the name, the place and the story, are investigated, 
especially in Oscar and Lucinda. The investigation suggests that 
Babylon is a place where social "types" are more important than 
individuals, where luxuriousness abounds, where ornamentation 
and opulence are measures of value and fulfilment, and where 
inequalities are perpetuated. Indeed, Carey's strategies suggest not 
so much a community but a menagerie. In relation to this scene, the 
protagonists seem out of place: Lucinda is perceived as an outsider; 
Oscar's benevolence seems odd and misplaced. Indeed, an inversion 
in the perception of status is effected by the sustained irony. 
Babylon, here, recounts the story of confused tongues, 
highlights multiple idioms in a setting where differences 
multiply, and suggests the protagonist's necessary but impossible 
attempts to make sense of the languages of the "beasts". It is this 
Babelian inability to master the meanings of the images or signs, to 
maintain control over the church, over the image of the church, 
and the environment that is also highlighted at the end. In the 
context of the discussion of Derrida's emphasis on a transparency 
that somehow becomes an impossibility, the destruction of the 
glass church which Oscar had hoped to impose upon an alien 
environment becomes a resonant metaphor indeed. Could Carey be 
suggesting that transparency itself, and the violent imposition 
that is apparent in the fragmentation of the glass church, mark 
the opening of a deconstruction of the "tongues" or the idioms -
alien and transplanted from another place and another 
Weltansc11auung - which the figure of the glass church embedies? 
F.inally, Malouf's Babylon highlights concerns which are 
similar in a number of ways to the concerns of Said and Morrison. 
Certainly, racism is encoded in the idioms of many of the 
colonisers. The novel, Remembering Babylon, facilitates its irrup-
tion through the syntax. Malouf's strategy however is crucial: it is 
someone from London, that is, the heart of the empire, and not an 
aboriginal, who ultimately abandons the colonial settlement. It is 
this person's predicament which reveals the extent of the 
inequality and subjection. The continuity of an identity, crucially, 
is shattered by the colonisers' (with one or two exceptions) 
intolerance or indifference. It is not really Otherness that is the 
major problem but rather the conditions which make its 
construction possible or necessary, that is, the processes by which 
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the status of the subject as Other is formed, established, 
legitimised and perpetuated. When "their" written account of 
Gemmy's life is washed away in the rain, the reader is offered a 
resonant image of transformation after the colony. A language, a 
history, is erased. It is erased because it is insubstantial, perhaps, 
or inauthentic or false. Subsequently, the protagonist's own 
understanding of his life can be re-affirmed and re-figured in terms 
which are closer to his chosen environment, its sacred history and 
its ethos. The erasure of the other history and its implicit and 
explicit judgments seems to signify another beginning - one 
significantly that becomes a mystery (from the reader's point of 
view). The history of rendering the outsider as something alien so 
that (s)he is subsequently destined to occupy a lower position in a 
hierarchy that is clearly vicious is portrayed memorably and 
subtly in the novel. The starting point that is a mystery at the 
novel's end is not transparent for the coloniser and interestingly for 
the reader too; what follows is not incorporated into the "official" 
history nor can it be refigured in the terms of the colonisers nor, 
presumably, can it be contaminated by their historiographies. In a 
dramatic moment pregnant with suggestions of emancipation and 
flight -....:. a flight out of Babylon, in a sense - Malouf renders the 
ostensible master narrative deeply problematic by insisting upon 
the events and stories it systematically excludes or overlooks or 
erases; by highlighting its blind spots and the extent to which it 
fails to provide any representation of the other which might be 
said to be truthful, faithful and/ or accurate. 
Babylon, in Malouf's work, then becomes a thing of the past. It 
is certainly associated with imperialist gestures (p.168), hege-
mony, the discourses of an "enlightenment" which the figuration 
and erasure in the novel often reveal as discourses of domination 
and enslavement. Babylon is remembered: in other words, it is a 
place, a name, a story, which has been surmounted but which 
haunts the present time as a trace. Its historiography is shown to 
be unsystematic and never fully representative in spite of 
intentions. 
In Carey's novel, the collapse of an idea or a grand conception 
(which itself presupposes the gesture of domination or 
colonisation) emphasises the uncontainable expanses of a world 
and of a terrain. In this context, water functions as a metonymic 
representation: the object of fear, the repressed, irrupts through 
the barriers constructed to prevent its release and destroys the 
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mechanisms, the structures and the life of the (colonial) host. In 
Malouf's novel, the colonisers' universalising narratives bear 
within them the seed of their own dismantling - the dismantling 
of the dream of colonising the other is enacted in the very structure 
of the novel. (One should not forget here that the biblical Babylon 
is itself implicated irrevocably in the history of imperialism.) It 
is striking indeed that Malouf should suggest the possibility of 
renewal through a figure who returns to the wilds, away from the 
empire and away from his own origins; and that Malouf should 
suggest that a possible facilitator of unity between two races 
should be lost to those who claim to speak in the name of progress 
and enlightenment. 
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